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Abstract: Universal access to water is acknowledged as a fundamental human right 
which governments have to secure. To improve access to water, it has been argued 
that an important factor, if not the most important, is to strengthen water sector 
governance and reduce corruption. Looking at the relationship between governance 
indicators and access to water sources and controlling for various factors, our 
contribution fills a gap in proving empirically, for a cross-country analysis including 
147 countries, that governance indeed matters. In particular, we add a nuance to the 
debate, showing that rural population is more vulnerable to weak governance. 








“The main reason behind [the lack of access to clean water] is 
not the lack of a natural supply of water, nor is it primarily an 
engineering problem, i.e. stemming from the lack of technical 
solutions. Instead, this global water crisis is primarily a crisis of 
governance.” 
Stålgren (2006: 3)  
 
1. The Water Crisis – A Governance Crisis? 
On 28 July 2010 the United Nations explicitly recognized the human right to water 
and sanitation and acknowledged that clean drinking water and sanitation are 
essential to the realization of all human rights.1 But unlike the unfortunately 
widespread perception, water is a scarce resource, and a resource that usually has to 
be processed before being apt for consumption. Water used in most of our daily 
activities must be clean, free of germs, chemicals, or any type of contamination. As 
defined by the WHO/UNICEF (2012), ‘‘an improved drinking-water source is one 
that by the nature of its construction adequately protects the source from outside 
contamination, in particular from faecal matter’’. Due to the importance of water, it 
is commonly agreed upon that governments should assure its correct provision and 
guarantee full access to its population. Therefore, many countries have introduced 
Universal Service Obligations (USO) that can be defined as ‘‘the obligation of an 
operator to provide all users with a range of basic services of good quality and 
affordable rates’’ (Cremer, H., Grasmi, F., Grimaud, A., and J.J Laffont, 2001, 7); 
amongst others, water.   
Unfortunately, in many countries, people do not have access to potable water, and 
therefore live in inappropriate and unfavourable conditions. Therefore, the United 
Nations included access to drinking water and sanitation as one of its Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG). Specifically, target 10 of MDG 7 states the objective of 
doubling the population who has sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic 
sanitation by 2015. Since, 193 countries and 23 international organizations committed 
themselves to the achievement of this goal. There are visible results. From 1990 to 
2010, two billion people gained access to improved drinking water sources 
(WHO/UNICEF, 2012). 
Nevertheless, according to the WHO, in 2010 more than 783 million people, an 11% 
of the world’s total population, weren’t that lucky. A regional analysis points out that 
Sub-Sahara Africa is the region which accounts for more than 40% of the population 
without access to improved water, while on the other side, China and India account 
for almost half of the population who gained access to improved sanitation facilities 
(WHO/UNICEF, 2012).   
                                                          
1
 See UN Resolution 64/292 and UN website http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/human_right_to_water.shtml.   
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But how can we explain these gaps in access? Is it a lack of availability of natural 
fresh water resources or a lack of funds for financing network expansion and water 
treatment? While referring to the water crisis, Transparency International (2008: 
XIX) states, just as Stålgren (2006: 3) in our initial quote above, that “[…] it is a 
crisis of governance: man-made, with ignorance, greed and corruption at its core. 
But the worst of them all is corruption.” The logic linking governance2 to access to 
water is pretty straightforward. Good governance, characterized by transparency, 
participation, accountability, and low levels of corruption, leads to a better 
government management and performance in its task of guaranteeing access to water, 
and therefore to higher access to improved water sources. 
However, despite a general agreement that access to improved water sources depends 
on governance beyond usual suspects such as fresh water sources, infrastructure, 
population density and gross domestic product per capita, we are not aware of studies 
that show the relevance of this institutional factor beyond anecdotic evidence and 
case studies. We therefore empirically explore this relationship between access to 
improved water sources access and governance for 147 countries. We further 
differentiate between rural and urban areas, as it might be suspected that the situation 
in rural areas could be worse than in the cities, as rural population could be left aside 
and ‘forgotten’ by politicians and public officials. Our results support the claim that 
governance indeed matters; and more so in rural areas.  
 
Map. Percentage of population without access to improved water source (2013) 
 
 
Source: World Bank eAtlas (http://data.worldbank.org/products/data-visualization-tools/eatlas) 
                                                          
2
 We follow Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón (1999: 1) who defined governance “[…] broadly as the traditions and 
institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes (1) the process by which governments are selected, 
monitored and replaced, (2) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and (3) the 
respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.” See, however, an 
excellent critical discussion in Baland, Moene and Robinson (2010) of the concept of governance, where the authors argue that 




In the following we first present a brief review of case study evidence and a 
theoretical framework describing the relationship between governance, corruption 
and access to water. Section three describes the data and our empirical strategy. The 
results that show that access to improved water sources indeed does depend on 
governance as measured in three indicators are presented and discussed in section 
four. Section five concludes. 
 
2. Relationship between Access to Public Services and Governance 
2.1 Evidence from Case Studies 
It is increasingly argued that a limited access to water does not only depend on 
availability of natural fresh water resources alone. Rather, it is a seen as an 
institutional failure: the institutional (“governance”) context does not provide the 
adequate incentives and framework for the government and providers to comply with 
their task to guarantee access to water for all. The reasons behind that can be 
manifold. For instance, Akhmouch (2012: 8) highlights factors that may impede an 
effective governmental policy with respect to access to water, such as “[…] the 
absence of integrated planning of water use; dispersed and uncoordinated 
multilateral, bilateral and international donor agencies; the lack of transparent and 
effective institutions for arbitrating conflicts over water use; and a lack of vision of 
what is actually necessary to effectively govern water.” In the following we briefly 
review the literature that looks at particular cases, at regional or country level. 
However, to the best of our knowledge, no study has tested the influence of 
governance on the access to improved water sources in a cross-country setting.   
Akhmouch (2012: 6), in her thorough study for the OECD, affirms that in Latin 
American and Caribbean (LAC) countries “[…] the primary obstacle pointed out … 
is the policy gap, followed by the accountability gap and the funding gap. 
Information and capacity gaps are also crucial in two-thirds of LAC countries 
surveyed.” These gaps make allusion to the insufficient availability or access to 
inputs needed to ensure an adequate service provision: i.e. weak political framework, 
lack of transparency and institutional quality, insufficient financial resources, 
insufficient access to information, and lack of scientific and technical expertise and 
infrastructure. Additionally, Akhmouch (2012) states that it is not possible to think of 
a “one-size-fits-all” solution to solve these different governance problems among 
LAC countries, but rather emphasizes that it is necessary to study and examine each 
specific context in order to design appropriate strategies that will serve to achieve 
universal access to water.3  
                                                          
3
 The idea that “context matters” is becoming almost a new lemma, especially in the development arena. We support this view, 
without having to fall into the relativistic trap. Rather, we may follow the basic idea expressed by Rodrik (2007): there is one 
economics (i.e. basic principles), but many recipes (i.e. institutional materialization of these principles). 
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Mehta, Fugelsnes and Virjee (2005) are looking at Sub-Saharan Africa’s situation in 
achieving the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of access to safe drinking 
water. In particular the authors underscore that the countries “[…] will need to 
implement cost recovery policies and use public resources better so as to increase 
sector performance, help the poor gain access to water and sanitation, and leverage 
more resources into the sector’’ (p. 240). Again governance matters, as the policies 
mentioned do not arise in a policy vacuum, but are the result of a political process 
which depends on the quality of institutions in place. Mehta et al. (2005) also 
highlight the importance of the availability and access to information in order to 
design correct plans to achieve the MDG. 
In a case study on Nigeria, Olomola et al. (2012) explicitly focus on the relationship 
between governance and public service delivery. The authors recognize the 
importance of accountability and participation in the achievement of good 
governance and consequently in the growth and development of the country. An 
important point that they address is the influence of particular characteristics of the 
population in the governance of water services. Olomola et al. (2012: 2) found that 
‘‘[…] participation depends on household and community characteristics such as 
educational attainment, income, geographical domain as well as channel of service 
delivery and geo-political zones.” Along these lines, Olomola et al (2012) emphasize 
that those who can actually ask for accountability, are the ones with higher incomes, 
who have enough empowerment to do so. These points made by the authors suggest 
that there might be a distinction between urban and rural areas with respect to the link 
between governance and access to water, which we thought interesting to follow up 
on in our study.   
Finally, GDN (2012) studies the situation in Uganda, and highlights the numerous 
challenges which appeared with the transition from public service provision to 
privatization, stating that it is more difficult for the government to control private 
agents’ actions than to control public officials.4 The study also states that even when 
increasing the funds, the situation in the water sector didn’t change much from 2005 
to 2009, which supports the idea that there are more important aspects to consider, 
e.g. governance. Especially, the author emphasize the disastrous effects of corruption 
on access to water as resources devoted to water services are channelled into private 
pockets instead: “The water sector follows a similar pattern with access to safe water 
in rural and urban areas remained at 65 percent and 66 percent respectively despite 
increases in funding from UGX 110.02 billion to UGX 172.24 billion over the same 
period. There are reports of wide spread corruption and embezzlement of funds 
meant for service delivery in Uganda” (GDN, 2012, p. V). 
 
 
                                                          
4
 See also Rose-Ackermann (1999: 86), for a similar point especially with respect to corruption. She warns that structural 
reforms such as liberalisation and privatisation without strengthening the institutions through adequate reforms of the 
government capacity to control and regulate, may only lead to establishing corrupt relations, private monopolies, and 




2.2 Governance, Corruption, and Access to Water  
In policy papers today, governance is widely acknowledged as a key issue in the 
water sector.5 On the one hand, this can be explained by the importance that 
governance and corruption issues have gained since the mid-1990s. On the other 
hand, many social, political, infrastructural and technological reforms haven't been 
enough to guarantee sufficient improved water access, which triggered the necessity 
to search for deeper malfunctions within the water sector. Tropp (2007: 20) 
underscores that “[…] the effective application of technology and the proper 
functioning of infrastructure require an enabling governance system.” For this 
reason, how decisions are taken, who participates, and on which information 
processes are based, has become a worldwide issue in the water sector (Tropp, 2007).  
In particular, as suggested by GDN (2012) and many other authors (e.g. Davis, 2004, 
or Transparency International, 2008) the water sector is vulnerable to corruption. 
Corruption can be understood as both a symptom and cause of weak governance. 
Factors facilitating corruption of all kinds and levels in this sector are, for instance, 
the absence of competition in the market, and thus either the need for regulatory 
oversight implying a close interaction between public and private sphere, or direct 
public service delivery, with the danger of clientelistic practices or embezzlement of 
public funds, inelastic demand, or the important infrastructure and construction 
component, known for offering extensive opportunities to corruption.  
Plummer and Cross (2007) clusters the many different corrupt practices that may 
arise in the water sector along the main processes typical for the water sector, the 
value-chain. Each process is prone to different types of corruption, and the 
consequences for the effectiveness and efficiency of the water sector are tremendous. 
González de Asís (2009: 36) provide an overview of impacts of corruption in the 
water sector and stresses, for instance, that corruption may in particular increase 
construction, operation and maintenance costs. Davis (2004) estimated that water 
providers in South Asia might spend 20 to 35 % more on construction contracts than 
the value of the services provided. Estache and Kouassi (2002) estimated that as 
much as two-thirds of the operating costs for 21 water companies in Africa were 
attributable to corruption. Corruption also influences project selection and slows 
down implementation, further reducing the direct economic benefits and the financial 
viability of water utilities. All these effects may arguably have a direct negative 
impact on coverage. But corruption in the water sector also has more indirect 
negative consequences, affecting disproportionately the poor. Drinking water of poor 
quality may lead to diarrhoea due to contaminated water, especially amongst 
children. Population without access to piped water is particularly prone to bad quality 
and overpriced water as they have to rely on informal water service providers. If 
                                                          
5
 See, for instance, the UNDP Water Governance Facility website (www.watergovernance.org/), the Water Integrity Network 
(WIN, www.waterintegritynetwork.net/), or the OECD Programme on Water Governance (www.oecd.org/gov/water).  
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access to improved water sources is limited because of corruption and weak 
governance, we are again confronted with a vicious cycle.  
Corruption therefore is likely to undermine government’s effectiveness in 
guaranteeing access to water. In turn, accountability of public officials, active 
citizens’ participation, and available information all allegedly play important roles in 
limiting corruption, strengthening governance, and therefore in guaranteeing an 
adequate exercise of the government’s functions. The relationship between 
transparency and participation on accountability is pretty straightforward: if 
information is not available to citizens, it is more difficult for them to know how the 
government is being managed. Therefore citizens are unlikely to be able to effectively 
participate in processes, express concerns and sanction bad decisions by the 
government. Consequently government’s performance is likely to not reflect their 
needs, and may further open opportunities to corruption, nurturing a vicious cycle of 
weak institutions, corruption, and bad performance. Keefer (2004: 24) states it as it 
follows, “[…] the emphasis on voice and accountability rests on a natural and 
persuasive logic: governments that pay little attention to citizen concerns – because 
citizens are unable to voice them or are unable to sanction governments that ignore 
them – are less likely to pursue policies that further social welfare.”  
2.2.1 Transparency and Participation 
Corruption and bad performance breed in opacity. As highlighted in Boehm (2011: 
302), [w]hen looking at the underlying factors facilitating corruption, much can be 
explained by the principal–agent–client relationships and the resulting informational 
advantages at various levels. Indeed, asymmetric information creates scope for 
informational rents, but also for strategic manipulation of information and collusion 
of actors.” Partly, legislation, and its effective implementation of course, can be an 
answer. Al Afghani (2009) compares England’s and Indonesia’s legislation and 
emphasizes the importance for the water sector of a law that guarantees access to 
information. In a nutshell, informational issues are serious problems that many 
countries still need to solve. However, what at first sight appears to be mainly a 
technical issue is actually highly political and sensitive. As information is power, 
those benefitting from the opaque status quo are likely to invest considerable efforts 
in impeding the provision of information in an effective way.   
Participation, i.e. voice, is the ability of individuals or a group to be heard and taken 
into account in certain decisions or policies. Ideally, in order to be able to take 
informed decisions based on the needs and preferences of the citizens, government 
should allow citizens to participate through an adequate institutional framework. 
Eliminating or hampering the relationship between the government and the citizens, 
in turn, impedes accountability, opens doors to corruption, and in consequence 
hampers the achievement of good governance and the quality and relevance of public 
policies.   
Referring to the water sector, Transparency International (2008: XXVIII), states that 
“[t]ransparency and participation build the very trust and confidence that 
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accountable water governance demands and civil society plays a critical role in 
turning information and opportunities for participation into effective public 
oversight.” The fundamental idea goes back, at least, to Becker (1983: 327), who 
recognizes the importance of conforming groups that “[…] are assumed to use 
political influence to enhance the well-being of their members. Competition among 
these pressure groups for political influence determines the equilibrium structure of 
taxes, subsidies, and other political favors.” 
However, individuals are confronted with the problem of collective action, and many 
interests may be unable to conform as a pressure group that could effectively 
participate in the policy arena. In particular, the problem in public service sectors is 
that the ones affected are generally the poor, and especially the poor in rural areas. 
For them, the costs of any collective action are likely to be higher than the expected 
benefits. Therefore they may not be able to effectively participate in the government´s 
decision making processes. A possible consequence could be that public agencies just 
don’t consider their will or try to improve their situation.  
Rather, decision-making processes may be captured by small elites, viz. the rich, 
urban, minority. Auriol and Blanc (2008), for instance, show that prices for piped 
water in countries in Sub-Sahara Africa are subsidized, but only reach the rich 
population who has access to the system, while poor and middle class often have to 
rely on informal water providers. According to the authors, this suggests a problem of 
capture by the ruling elite, who are the ones that design energy and water policies 
without much concern about their optimality.   
Now, what about votes? At least in democracies, this could be a way the poor could 
express their discontent with a given government’s performance. However, topics 
that drive elections are usually related to unemployment, security or the like rather 
than to water, so elections may only be a very indirect, and ineffective, way of 
accountability for such specific issues. Nevertheless, granting access to water in 
certain areas actually may be driven by the possibility to obtain votes. As Boehm 
(2011: 318) reports from a case study in Zambia, expansions of the network may 
follow this logic. One interview partner answered as follows: “Needs-based projects? 
Yes, but based on the needs of the local politicians.” But, even if access to improved 
water sources could be generated this way, it happens in a very selective and arguably 
unfair manner.    
Finally, Paul (2001: 13) points out an interesting determinant of the use of 
participation: “[…] the relative costs of exit and voice and their levels may vary 
depending on the degree of market failure affecting the services.” While “exit” is an 
option if there are different alternatives, as it enables to hire other service providers 
when the community is not satisfied with the actual one, “voice” alludes to the 
pressure citizens can exert on public agents to act appropriately, according to what 
they want. Paul (2001) states that in markets with less market failures, the cost of 
voice is higher than the cost of exit, since in competitive environments the consumer 
can freely move from one provider to another. The opposite occurs when market 
failures are abundant, such as in the water sector, because the cost of exit is higher, if 
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not prohibitive, than the cost of voice, since consumers have no options to change 
their provider. Note that Paul (2001: 17) also points out that “[…] the public is likely 
to use voice only when there is a high probability that the public sector will be 
responsive and make this investment worthwhile.” That is, citizens need to get some 
feed-back: If nothing happens despite having voiced concerns or needs, apathy and 
cynicism may be the consequence, undermining even further the legitimacy of the 
government. 
2.2.2 Accountability 
The World Bank Institute (2005) defines accountability as “a proactive process by 
which public officials inform about and justify their plans of action, their behaviour, 
and results and are sanctioned accordingly.” Accountability is often seen as the key 
determinant to assure good governance; effective accountability implies transparency 
and participation, but adds the requirement of negative feedbacks (sanctions) in case 
of non-compliance with established rules or policy commitments. Without sanctions 
commitments to rules and policies are non-credible. Therefore, good accountability 
includes sticking to the rules, behaving according to the law, being effective at the 
assigned tasks, and making the right decisions (World Bank Institute, 2005).  
Furthermore, two types of accountability can be differentiated: horizontal and 
vertical. Horizontal accountability refers to those cases in which public agencies 
examine other government’s institutions and sanction them if they find that 
inappropriate actions were taken. These can be Supreme Audit Institutions, or in case 
of the water sector, the regulatory agency or the Ministry supervising water providers, 
for instance. Vertical accountability occurs when the control of the government’s 
actions is exerted by the citizens. The importance of both types of accountability is 
recognized by Paul (2001). The author argues that accountability is effective only 
when, besides the government control over public services providers (horizontal 
accountability), the citizens have exit and voice (vertical accountability). In other 
words, if the community doesn’t have the ability to exit nor has voice, they can’t 
control that the providers behave as they should or that the network is expanded to 
reach their households.  
Therefore, it can be conjectured that more accountable governments should lead to 
better results, including with respect to access to water. We expect corruption, lack of 
accountability (sanctions), lack of transparency, and lack of participation (exit and 
voice), to have measurable negative impacts on access to improved water, through 
their effects on reducing government’s effectiveness and compromise in complying 








3. Data and Empirical Strategy 
3.1 Data 
The data we used to test this expected relationship between governance and access to 
improved water sources was obtained from the online World Bank database6. The 
variables are countries’ statistics from all regions of the world. The endogenous 
variables used in this study are from 2010, and are: (i) percentage of total population 
with access to improved water source, (ii) percentage of rural population with access 
to improved water source, and (iii) percentage of urban population with access to 
improved water source. As control variables, we used the rural population as a 
proportion of the total population, roads paved as a percentage of total roads in each 
country (as a proxy for infrastructure), renewable internal freshwater resources per 
capita measured in cubic meters, GDP per capita PPP in constant 2005 international 
USD, and population density as people per sq. km of land area. This set of control 
variables was taken from the World Bank database and their values correspond to the 
year 2009; except for renewable internal freshwater resources per capita, which 
reports data from year 2007.  
Our three explanatory variables, the governance indicators, were taken from the 
World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) online database7, produced by 
Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi. Three out of the six WG 
indicators enable us to directly test the three aspects found to be relevant in section 
two above: corruption, lack of accountability, and weak government effectiveness.  
Therefore, our first explanatory variable is the Control of Corruption indicator.8 
According to the WGI website, this variable specifically “reflects perceptions of the 
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and 
grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private 
interests.” The second governance indicator is Voice and Accountability in order to 
test the importance of an accountable government. Again according to the WGI 
website, the variable “reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens 
are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and a free media.” At first sight, this one is 
perhaps the most representative indicator, since it includes participation, voice, and 
accountability, and therefore should also lead to lower levels of corruption and better 
performance. Finally, we included a direct measure of Government Effectiveness, 
which the WGI website describes as reflecting “perceptions of the quality of public 
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from 
political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the 
credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.” It is important to point 
                                                          
6
 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator  
7
 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp  
8
 We use the Control of Corruption Indicator from the WGI instead of the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) from Transparency 
International for convenience only; both are highly correlated. Other indicators such as the Global Corruption Barometer, by 
Transparency International, tend to reflect petty corruption only. Here, we are interested in the overall perceived level of 
corruption in a country.  
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out that these indicators widely reflect perceptions, since it is quite difficult, if not 
impossible, to measure them as objectively as might be wished.  
The data of the explanatory variables employed corresponds to the year 2005. We 
considered it necessary to leave a period of time between the governance indicators 
and the variables of analysis, which belong to data from 2010. Five years might be an 
appropriate lapse of time for governance indicators to impact on the countries’ 
situation regarding access to improved water sources.  
The initial database contained a sample of 214 countries, while the one of the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators included 215 countries. Unfortunately, we had to 
drop certain countries from the sample because of their missing values in the 
variables needed for the regressions: 35 countries were deleted because they had 
missing values on the dependent variable Improved Water Source, 3 countries 
because they didn’t report data on Improved Water Source (urban), 13 countries 
because they had no data on Renewable Internal Freshwater Resources per capita, 10 
countries because they had missing values on GDP pc PPP, and 1 because it didn’t 
have data on roads paved. Another 5 countries were deleted because of missing data 
in one of the databases used. The final sample for our econometric approximation 
therefore includes a cross section of 147 countries.  
The summary statistics of the dependent, control, and explanatory variables, are 
presented in Table 1. In particular, for the endogenous variable Improved Water 
Source, we can observe for the whole sample of 147 observations by 2010 an average 
of 86.37 % of access to improved water source. For that same year, the results for 
rural and urban population access differ; the former one was below the total average, 
while the second one was above, with an 80.07 % and 94.17 % respectively. This 
confirms the need to analyse the two populations separately.  
12 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
Dependant Variables           
Improved water source 147 86,370 16,370 40,000 100,000 
Improved water source, rural  147 80,070 21,490 27,000 100,000 
Improved water source, urban  147 94,170 8,620 52,000 100,000 
Control Variables           
Rural population 147 0,450 0,220 0,020 0,900 
Roads, paved 147 48,790 33,680 0,800 100,000 
Renewable internal freshwater resources per capita 147 19.267,570 56.846,390 23,390 545.630,800 
Population density 147 132,450 193,750 1,750 1.293,720 
Square of Population density  147 54.286,990 199.935,000 3,060 1.673.711,000 
GDP pc PPP 147 11.525,360 13.259,970 303,390 67.962,640 
ln of GDP pc PPP 147 8,650 1,280 5,720 11,130 
Explanatory Variables           
Control of Corruption 147 -0,080 1,020 -0,146 2,350 
Voice and Accountability 147 -0,060 1,010 -1,660 2,160 
Government Effectiveness 147 -0,060 0,970 -1,950 1,770 
Note: Dependant Variables, as well as Control Variables, were obtained from the World Bank database. Explanatory Variables were extracted from World 
Governance Indicators. Al calculations were done with Stata.  
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Taking into account the plausible relationship between our explanatory variables, we 
considered it necessary to do a correlation test (see table 2). As expected, a high 
correlation was found between the governance indicators, i.e. a country with high 
levels of accountability would be expected to have low levels of corruption and vice 
versa. Nevertheless, each of these variables explains different aspects of the 
governance quality, but due to these strong correlations, we run different regressions 
with each one, in order to get appropriate estimators, and avoid problems of 
multicollinearity between the explanatory variables. Since there are 3 endogenous 
variables, and 3 governance indicators employed separately, we estimated in total 9 
regressions. The control variables were used in all the regressions. 
 
Table 2. Summary of correlations coefficients for Control of Corruption, Voice and 
Accountability, and Government Effectiveness 
  Correlations 
Variable 1 2 3 
1. Control of Corruption 1,000 
  2. Voice and Accountability 0,856 1,000 
 3. Government Effectiveness 0,955 0,870 1,000 
   
3.2 Empirical Methodology 
As the variables which we aimed to explain could only take values between 0 and 
100 %, with most observations being close to 100 %, it was necessary to use a model 
that limited the results to this range. We opted for the Tobit Model, which can be seen 
as a combination of a Probit model and an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model. The 
similarity with the Probit is that having access to improved water sources is a binary 
variable, that is, either you have access or not. On the other hand, it is comparable to 
the OLS because the percentage of the population who has access to an improved 
water source is a continuous variable between 0% and 100%. An OLS estimator 
would have been inconsistent in this case, because from the total sample the estimator 
only takes those observations with access to improved water sources, leaving aside 
the ones who don’t; the Tobit model, in turn, includes the whole set of observations 
considered for this study.  
Our objective is to explain the percentage of population, total, urban, and rural, with 
access to an Improved Water Source as a function of exogenous variables as control 
variables, and the relevant governance measures as explanatory variables. As 
mentioned, three models were estimated for each of our three endogenous variables. 
Model 1 included Control of Corruption, Model 2 Voice and Accountability, and 






4.1 Governance Indicators  
In Table 3, we show the results of our regressions for Improved Water Source, 
namely the percentage of the total population who had access to an improved water 
source by 2010. In Model 1, the estimation showed that the effect of Control of 
Corruption is significant; an increase in one unit in the perception that corruption is 
controlled in a country increases the access to improved water sources in the total 
population by 4.17 %. When considering Voice and Accountability in Model 2, the 
results obtained showed that an increase in one unit of the perception of this variable 
in each country increases improved access of the total population by 3.55 %. Model 
3, which uses Government Effectiveness as the governance indicator, shows that an 
increase of one unit increases the access by 4.51 %. 
The results therefore show that the governance indicators have a significant effect in 
explaining the access to improved water sources as expected. This confirms that these 
institutional variables play an important role when analysing the water sector.  
 
Table 3. Effects of governance on the Improved Water Source: total population 
Improved Water Source 
  Coefficient 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 





  (6,329) (6,577) (6,472) 
Roads, paved 0,169*** 0,181*** 0,168*** 
  (0,030) (0,031) (0,030) 
Renewable internal freshwater resources per 
capita 0,000** 0,000** 0,000*** 
  (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Population density 0,050*** 0,046*** 0,049*** 
  (0,017) (0,017) (0,017) 
Square of Population density  0,000** 0,000** 0,000** 
  (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
ln of GDP pc PPP 5,552*** 6,003*** 5,007*** 
  (1,487) (1,159) (1,582) 
Control of Corruption 4,176** - - 
  (1,796)     
Voice and Accountability - 3,553*** - 
    (1,319)   
Government Effectiveness - - 4,511** 
      (1,833) 




In table 4 we show the results when estimating the percentage of access of the rural 
population to improved water sources. Just as before, the estimates of governance 
indicators have all significant effects on the endogenous variable. In Model 1, an 
increase in one unit in the perception of the extent to which corruption in a country is 
controlled increases the access to improved water sources of the rural population by 
as much as 7.91 %. With Voice and Accountability, the direction of the effect is the 
same, but the magnitude is lower compared to the results shown in Table 3, Model 2. 
A one unit increase in the perception of Voice and Accountability in a country 
increases access to improved water sources by the rural population by 6.97 %. Again, 
the strongest effect was in Model 3, where an increase in one unit in the perception of 
Government Effectiveness, increases the rural population with access to improved 
water sources by 8.61 %. 
 
Table 4. Effects of governance on the Improved Water Source: rural population 
Improved Water Source, Rural 
  Coefficient 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Rural population -1,071 -0,328 -3,501 
  (8,645) (9,088) (8,605) 
Roads, paved 0,258*** 0,283*** 0,256*** 
  (0,043) (0,044) (0,042) 
Renewable internal freshwater resources per capita 0,000 0,000 0,000 
  (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Population density 0,064*** 0,056** 0,060*** 
  (0,021) (0,022) (0,022) 
Square of Population density  0,000** 0,000** 0,000** 
  (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
ln of GDP pc PPP 7,524*** 8,333*** 6,424*** 
  (2,002) (1,655) (2,190) 
Control of Corruption 7,912*** - - 
  (2,322)   
Voice and Accountability - 6,977*** - 
    (1,877)   
Government Effectiveness - - 8,619*** 
      (2,652) 
Note: ***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level 
 
Finally, table 5 shows the results for the regressions on Improved Water Source 
(Urban), i.e. the percentage of the urban population who has access to improved 
water sources. The estimations showed that increases in the scores of any of the three 
governance indicators have significant effects on the access to improved water 
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sources. Model 1 estimated that an increase in one unit in the perception of Control of 
Corruption increases the percentage of the urban population accessing improved 
water sources by 5.09 %. Model 2 and Model 3 also showed positive effects of the 
governance measurements on the regressed variable. An increase in one unit in Voice 
and Accountability increases it by 4.40 %, while an increase in one unit in 
Government Effectiveness reflects an increase of 5.74 % in the endogenous variable. 
Again, the variable with the greatest impact on access to water sources is Government 
Effectiveness. 
 
Table 5. Effects of governance on the Improved Water Source: urban population 
Improved Water Source, Urban 
  Coefficient 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Rural population -7,034* -6,480 -8,794** 
  (4,151) (4,349) (4,213) 
Roads, paved 0,119*** 0,133*** 0,118*** 
  (0,028) (0,030) (0,028) 
Renewable internal freshwater resources per capita 0,000*** 0,000*** 0,000*** 
  (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Population density 0,013 0,009 0,012 
  (0,012) (0,011) (0,012) 
Square of Population density  0,000 0,000 0,000 
  (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
ln of GDP pc PPP 1,753 2,291** 0,948 
  (1,202) (0,992) (1,371) 
Control of Corruption 5,093*** - - 
  (1,710)     
Voice and Accountability - 4,409*** - 
    (1,349)   
Government Effectiveness - - 5,744*** 
       (1,804) 
Note: ***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level 
 
When comparing the results, it can be observed that all three governance indicators 
have a greater impact when explaining access to improved water sources of the rural 
population. This suggests that the rural area is the most vulnerable to the poor control 
of government’s activities, and therefore to the proliferation of different practices of 
corruption, to the absence of voice and accountability, and to low government 
effectiveness. Since rural population, by definition, is located away from urban 
agglomerations, policy makers may see them as a group with less relevance for them. 
Consequently fewer resources are assigned to supply their necessities; and with 
corruption, even less of these resources will actually reach them.  
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Furthermore, especially in developing countries, rural citizens often don’t have the 
opportunity to exert their voice or participate, and thus are excluded de facto from 
decision making processes. Their needs and requests may be left aside. Due to the 
mentioned difficulties they may face in organizing themselves as a pressure group, it 
is more difficult, if not impossible, for them to hold the government accountable for 
this lack of interest in their needs. According to our results, any improvement in voice 
and accountability would lead to increase rural population’s access to improved water 
sources. The case for improving Government Effectiveness is similar, and even 
stronger; any increase in government effectiveness will have a higher impact in the 
rural sector. But note that government effectiveness is a result of a political process: 
if there is no pressure for the government to improve its effectiveness, e.g. through 
accountability processes, participation and transparency, the government is likely to 
waste no efforts in doing so.   
4.2 Control Variables 
The relationship we found between our control variables and access to improved 
water sources was as expected in almost all cases. Rural population, as a proportion 
of the total population, affects negatively the access to improved water sources for the 
total and urban population. This means that any increase in the rural population will 
decrease the percentage of the population who have access to improved water 
sources. This is quite straightforward. The amount of roads paved, as a percentage of 
the total roads in each country, has a positive relationship with the endogenous 
variables. We included this control variable because we considered it important to 
have an approximate measurement of the country´s infrastructure level, which is 
important in water provision. What the results show is that a 1 % increase in the roads 
paved, indeed increases the access to improved water sources of the total, urban, and 
rural population by 0.17 %, 0.12 %, and 0.26 % respectively. All the estimated 
coefficients of this variable were found to be significant.  
For the case of renewable fresh water resources per capita in each country, the effect 
found in the access to improved water sources is positive, but only significant in the 
case of the total and the urban population. The amount of freshwater resources per 
capita in a country does not affect significantly the access to improved water sources 
of the rural population. However, note that all coefficients are approximately 0.00, 
meaning that the access to improved water sources is really not determined by the 
amount of freshwater resources in a country, confirming the literature quoted above.  
The effect of density, defined as the total population per sq. km in each country, is 
positive and significant for access to improved water sources of the total and the rural 
population, not for the urban population. This indicates that increases in the amount 
of people concentrated in a sq. km tend to increase the percentage of the population 
with access to improved water sources. This might be explained by service providers 
being more interested in areas where more people can be served due to the costs of 
provision; the more concentrated the area to be served, the lower the marginal cost of 
provision. To evaluate if this effect was infinite, we calculated a new variable, 
namely square density. As expected, the effect is not infinite. Indeed, the positive 
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impact of density only works until a certain point, after which it turns out to be 
negative. It appears therefore that the lower costs of attending an additional consumer 
in the water sector have a limit, from which they begin to increase again.   
Instead of using the GDP pc PPP variable, the log of it was calculated and included in 
the model, seeking an appropriate approximation of the percentage of growth of this 
variable. Its effect is positive and significant in 7 of the 9 regressions. The 
coefficients of log of GDP pc PPP that are not significant were the ones estimated in 
the regressions of Model 1 and Model 3 of the endogenous variable Improved Water 
Source (Urban). This means that when Control of Corruption and Government 
Effectiveness are implemented as the explanatory variables, the log of the gross 
domestic product per capita PPP doesn’t have a significant effect on the percentage of 
the urban population with access to improved water sources; while in the other cases 
it does have a positive and significant effect, as mentioned. 
 
5. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Water is, if not the most, one of the most important natural resources people have. 
Therefore universal access to improved water sources should be a priority for all 
countries. Worldwide, 193 countries have committed themselves to the Millennium 
Development Goals. While the goal of achieving 88 % coverage have been reached, 
there is still an 11 % of the population who don’t have the privilege of obtaining 
potable water.  
While it is the government that is responsible to achieve access to water for all 
through public policies, it is also true that the government is subject to failures. In our 
study we aimed at exploring empirically the relationship between governance and 
access to improved water sources. We further differentiated between urban and rural 
population, as theory and case studies suggested there might be a difference between 
them with respect to governance aspects. Implementing a Tobit methodology for the 
econometric approximation, our results show clearly that governance indeed matters; 
and especially for the rural areas. According to the estimators, governance is more 
important than the amount of renewable internal freshwater resources per capita, the 
paved roads, the countries’ density, and the growth of GDP pc PPP—which of course 
doesn’t mean these latter variables are irrelevant. 
Our findings therefore confirm and give an empirical grounding to the claim that 
water sector governance matters; a fact that hardly surprises people who worked in 
the field aiming at implementing water sector reforms successfully. Despite access to 
fresh water resources and financing from general budget and bilateral or multilateral 
donors, these reforms have often not succeeded to improve access to water as desired. 
The policy recommendations are therefore straightforward and join the claim of the 
publications of the OECD, UNDP, the Water Integrity Network, Transparency 
International and others we cited above. Firstly, there is a need to empower water 
users, especially in rural and poor peri-urban areas, so that they can voice their needs 
and trigger a response by the government. Second, efforts must be made to minimize 
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corrupt opportunities in the sector. A large literature, which we partly cited above, 
have emerged recently, which emphasises the need to combine anti-corruption 
prevention with prosecution. Third, capacity development and strengthening 
administrative processes within water service providers and government authorities 
entrusted with the regulation of the sector are important in order to increase the 
government’s efficiency and effectiveness.  
However, technocratic solutions, either against corruption or to improve government 
effectiveness, have proven to be difficult to implement when political will to support 
such reforms is lacking. But this political support does not fall from heaven: it is the 
result of a political process. We therefore underscore in particular the aspect of voice 
and participation, leading to vertical accountability, as we believe this might be the 
only true origin for sustainable change of the sector. The path for such an incremental 
change might be facilitated by providing support to civil society (including academia 
and media), user groups, and users that have to rely on informal water providers in 
organising and participating effectively in their demand for better water services. 
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